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Venäjän keskuspankilla on useita sellaisia tehtäviä, jotka eivät yleensä ole kuuluneet ke-
skuspankeille. Sen lisäksi, että Venäjän keskuspankki toteuttaa rahapolitiikkaa, se toimii 
pankkivalvojana, hallinnoi Venäjän talletussuojajärjestelmää ja on pääomistaja Venäjän 
suurimmassa liikepankissa. Tutkimuksessa käsitellään ensin sitä, kuinka taloustieteellinen 
tutkimus käsittelee keskuspankkien optimaalisia tehtäviä ja miten Venäjän keskuspankin 
nykyiset tehtävät poikkeavat tästä optimista. Tämän jälkeen testataan empiirisesti, miten 
pankkivalvonnan säilyttäminen keskuspankissa vaikuttaa rahapolitiikkaan. Yksinkertaisen 
estimoidun Taylor-säännön avulla pystytään selvittämään, että Venäjän keskuspankki ei 
ole ilmeisesti käyttänyt pankkivalvonnasta saamiaan tietoja koko rahoitusjärjestelmän 
vakauden parantamiseen, vaan pikemminkin suurten, julkisessa omistuksessa olevien 
pankkien etujen mukaisesti. 
 
Asiasanat: keskuspankki, pankkivalvonta, rahapolitiikan säännöt, Venäjä 
  





The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) assumes a wide range of func-
tions not traditional to a central bank. In addition to the daily conduct
of monetary policy, it acts as a regulator and supervisor of the bank-
ing sector, is responsible for the implementation of a deposit insurance
scheme and is the main owner of Russia’s largest commercial bank,
Sberbank. I review how the current design of the CBR deviates from
the optimal allocation of regulatory powers prescribed in the litera-
ture and generates scope for conﬂicts within the CBR policy objective
function. I then empirically investigate the need for a supervisory
body within the CBR. Using a simple Taylor rule framework I ﬁnd
that the CBR does not use its “hands-on” supervisory information
to maintain ﬁnancial stability, but rather to accomodate state-owned
banks’ balances.
Keywords: Central Bank, Prudential Regulation and Supervision,
Monetary Policy Rules, Russia.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: G21, G28.
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11 Introduction
When discussing the optimal conduct of monetary policy, many authors take
the view that a central bank’s objectives should consist exclusively of keep-
ing inﬂation low, ensuring stable economic growth and maintaining ﬁnancial
stability — with emphasis on the ﬁrst two, particularly inﬂation ﬁghting. As
a result, much of the literature on monetary policy concerns ways to achieve
low inﬂation through improvements in institutional design and promotion of
central bank independence.1 In reality, many central banks do not consis-
tently adhere to the policy guidelines set out by e.g. Mishkin (2000a) in their
daily conduct of monetary policy, mainly because they assume a grab bag
of regulatory functions not generally seen as central to monetary policy, and
moreover may conﬂict with monetary policy objectives. The Central Bank of
Russia (CBR) is a prime example of a central bank that assumes a wide range
of often-conﬂicting functions. Besides the daily conduct of monetary policy,
the CBR acts as a regulator and supervisor of the banking sector, assumes
single licensing and closure authority over banks and acts as a lender of last
resort (LLR) for imperilled banks. The CBR is also presently implementing
a deposit insurance scheme (DI), and is the country’s single largest creditor
and main owner of Sberbank, Russia’s largest bank. Thus, the multi-tasked
CBR faces abundant opportunities for conﬂicts of interest as it engages in
its various functions.
This paper explores how the CBR’s “in-house” bank supervision function
may complement the central bank’s other functions and objectives. It pro-
vides an empirical evaluation of the current ﬁnancial supervisory authority
(FSA) arrangement within the central bank, investigating whether “hands-
on” supervisory information is useful for monetary policy and whether the
CBR uses this information in the conduct of monetary policy in setting in-
terest rates. Supervisory information can be particularly useful to a central
bank in times of bank distress, since monetary policy can be used to accom-
modate bank balances and avoid ﬁnancial turmoil. Using a simple Taylor
rule framework, I ﬁnd that the CBR does not use its hands-on supervisory
information to maintain ﬁnancial stability, but rather to accommodate state-
owned banks’ balances.
The paper is organised as follows. I begin section 2 with a brief review of
the literature on the optimal allocation of regulatory powers within a central
bank and apply select insights to an appraisal of potential alterations to the
CBR’s regulatory design. The discussion in the next section then turns to
1For a discussion on the need for central bank independence in achieving inﬂation
targets, see Cukierman (1994) and references therein.
2the CBR’s role of regulator and supervisor of the banking sector. I empir-
ically investigate the usefulness of supervisory information for the conduct
of monetary policy and analyse whether the current design of supervision
contributes to our understanding of the central bank’s monetary policy be-
haviour through monetary policy rules. Section 4 concludes.
2 A review of the literature on regulatory de-
sign and lessons for the CBR
The CBR presently assumes a wide range of functions. Because of the incon-
sistencies they potentially generate, this has implications on how smoothly
the central bank operates. The literature suggests that the current regulatory
design impairs the CBR’s ability to adequately achieve all its objectives. This
section brieﬂy surveys the literature on optimal design of banking regulation
and relates it to the current functions taken on by the CBR.
Introduction
Until the end of the 19th century, central banks did not generally assume
an explicit role of lender of last resort nor shoulder supervisory and regulatory
tasks. The subsequent changes in banking (and ﬁnancial markets more gen-
erally), however, necessitated a lender-of-last-resort (LLR) function.2 Cen-
tral banks now often act as LLRs for otherwise economically sound banks
with liquidity problems.3 The speciﬁc nature of commercial banking, where
banks are mainly involved in granting long-term (illiquid) loans and receiv-
ing short-term (liquid) deposits from the public, makes the banking sector
particularly vulnerable to shocks. The main risks that arise from transform-
ing deposits into long-term credit portfolios are interest-rate risk (due to the
maturity mismatch) and liquidity risk (due to the possibility of unexpected
withdrawals by depositors). In the event of multiple withdrawals by depos-
itors, a bank will be unable to fully service all depositors at the same time.
When a bank is hit by such a liquidity shock and is unable to extract funds
via the interbank market, the bank may turn to the LLR to meet liquidity
demands of its depositors.
2See e.g. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) and Goodhart (2000) on how the changing
nature of the ﬁnancial system has aﬀected the functions and objectives of central banks.
Capie et al. (1994) describe how central bank functions have evolved over time.
3Bagehot (1873) put forward the rules for extending LLR funds for the Bank of England
to “distinctly acknowledge that it is its duty to support the market in times of panic” by
lending to “illiquid but solvent banks” but at “penalty rates.”
3Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that banks can be protected from bank
runs through the government provision of depositor insurance (DI). While DI
may solve the coordination failure between a large group of small depositors
(and thus lower systemic risk), it can also increase the moral hazard present
on the banks’ side by removing the incentive for depositors to monitor their
banks. Moreover, the bank’s own proﬁtability concerns create moral hazard
problems in choosing its asset portfolio. In the presence of DI, risk-taking
behaviour on behalf of the bank can be heightened by limiting the liability
the bank faces in the event of default. Such increased risk-taking increases
the probability of bank failures.
In general, bank stability is aﬀected by vulnerability to individual runs
and systemic risk on the liability side and bank risk-taking behaviour on the
asset side. Most safety and soundness regulatory instruments in the banking
industry aim at reducing the perverse incentives banks face when composing
their asset portfolios through banking regulation and prudential supervision.4
Supervision and systemic stability
Countries may use a number of arrangements for the allocation of bank
supervision.5 If a central bank is concerned with systemic stability and acts
as a LLR, one can argue that supervision should be in the hands of the
central bank to facilitate its LLR functions. Since only those banks whose
solvency is at doubt typically come to the central bank for help, as LLR,
the central bank will only be inclined to lend when the bank’s failure poses
at h r e a tt oﬁnancial system stability - a judgement that can be facilitated
on the basis of “in-house” supervisory information. When there is a well-
functioning interbank market, however, solvent banks can get loans elsewhere
when they need extra liquidity. Private supervisory information may then
be useful in gauging a bank’s solvency.
When a central bank’s primary concern is maintaining ﬁnancial stability,
it may be reluctant to close down a large bank6 and resort to regulatory
4Much of the focus of prudential regulation has been on bank solvency via capital ad-
equacy requirements. These requirements are intended to reduce the gambling behaviour
of banks by putting bank equity at risk (see e.g. BIS Core Principles for eﬀective bank-
ing supervision (1997) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) for a more general discussion).
See also Mishkin (2000b) and Summer (2002) on the need for prudential supervision and
banking regulation.
5For example, the US Federal Reserve assumes supervisory functions, but shares them
with other supervisory agencies. In the Netherlands, supervision has always been a central
bank function. In Finland and the UK, the ﬁnancial supervisory authorities are separate
from the central bank, but work in close cooperation. In Russia, supervision and prudential
regulation are housed within the CBR.
6For example, because of reputational issues or because the central bank wants to
4forbearance. On the other hand, if banks assume forbearance will be forth-
coming, they may increase their risky behaviour and produce precisely the
outcome the central bank hoped to avoid. Already we can see that combining
LLR and supervisory functions may be incongruent within the central bank’s
objective function.
Moreover, focusing on reducing moral hazard runs the danger of distract-
ing the ﬁnancial supervisory authority from assessing how its actions impact
the economy. A uniﬁed regulator must be willing to grapple with the conﬂict
between strict enforcement and maintaining systemic stability.
These conﬂicts are real and cannot simply be avoided through institu-
tional design. Claeys et al. (2005a) empirically investigate the degree of reg-
ulatory forbearance for the Russian banking market. The evidence suggests
that prudential regulations in Russia are not eﬀectively enforced because they
conﬂict with other objectives inherent to the CBR’s objective function. To
the extent that regulatory forbearance impacts the risk-taking behaviour of
banks, our results provide some empirical support for separating supervision
and LLR functions. Nonetheless, a single authority may be preferable when
conﬂicts intensify, because it can adhere to its internal hierarchy of LLR and
supervisory functions and let the hierarchy depend on the situation at hand
t or e a c ha ne ﬃcient outcome.7
Supervision, deposit insurance and lender of last resort
Much of the theoretical literature focuses on speciﬁc aspects of banking
supervision. One strand of literature analyses the usefulness of capital ade-
quacy rules as part of prudential regulation in reducing moral hazard prob-
lems in banking.8 Some authors focus on how deposit insurance schemes (DI)
may aﬀect moral hazard and how DI should be optimally designed.9 As m a l l
group of papers address the question of how diﬀerent regulatory functions
should be optimally coordinated to avoid inconsistent policy.
A relatively new strand of investigation deals with the “LLR-DI-FSA
maintain a well-functioning payments system when the large bank is an important player
in the interbank market.
7See Wall and Eisenbeis (1999) for a general discussion on how regulatory structure
impacts priority choices among conﬂicting public policy goals. Eisenbeis (2004) discusses
agency problems and goal conﬂicts in designing a ﬁnancial regulatory structure with a
special focus on the EMU.
8See e.g. the Journal of Banking and Finance,Volume 19, Issues 3-4, pp. 393-741 (June
1995) on “The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions.”
9See e.g. Prescott (2002), Cordella and Yeyati (2002) and Morrison and White (2004).
Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2001) empirically review deposit insurance design across coun-
tries. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) empirically analyse the impact of deposit
insurance on banking system stability.
5nexus,” i.e. analysing for the optimal allocation of the lender-of-last resort,
deposit insurance and supervision functions.10 Using an incomplete contracts
setting, Repullo (2000) considers who should act as LLR: the central bank or
a deposit insurance agency (DIA)? His results indicate that the LLR function
should be allocated contingent upon the size of the liquidity shock banks are
facing. He further assumes that supervisory information can be shared and
that the agency in charge of LLR collects it. This information is assumed
to contain qualitative information that enables the supervisor to generate an
assessment of the bank’s assets, although this information is not veriﬁable.
A sar e s u l t ,as o l v e n tb a n kc a nb ed e n i e dal o a na n da ni n s o l v e n tb a n kc a n
get a loan. This is important because of the imparity between the agencies’
objective functions and the social welfare function. A central bank is assumed
to care about the impact of a bank failure on systemic stability, while a
deposit insurer is assumed to care about the impact of a bank failure on
reimbursement of insured depositors. The main results suggest a role for both
the central bank and the DIA as LLR; the central bank for small liquidity
shocks, the DIA for large liquidity shocks.
When applying this setting to the CBR, one can assume that part of
the supervisory information available to the central bank cannot be observed
by outsiders. Further, the CBR’s main objective is somewhat clouded as it
also happens to be the main owner of Russia’s largest commercial bank. In
addition to the expected pay-oﬀ from the loan of last resort, systemic and
individual bank stability, as well as the repayment of insured depositors (once
DI comes into force)11 enter the equation.
Repullo (2000) suggests a way to determine who should be responsible
for bank supervision. When small liquidity shocks are more frequent than
large ones, his model suggests that the central bank should be in charge of
supervision. This argument, however, is limited to the consideration that
when the costs of transferring information are high, the agency that uses the
information most should be in charge of supervision. It ignores the impact
of possible conﬂicts of interest on risk-taking behaviour of banks, as well as
the costs of increased risk-taking created by a) the presence of an LLR, or
b) low enforcement of prudential regulation, in the objective functions of the
diﬀerent agencies. The propensity for risk-taking could be incorporated into
the analysis by assuming that a supervised bank has opportunities to divert
funds to more risky projects and that the probability that the bank will
gamble depends on which body assumes the LLR and supervisory functions.
10Others analyze the issue of how regulation should be optimally designed more gener-
ally. Mayes (2005) presents an enlightening discussion of the issues at hand.
11This is scheduled for implementation by the end of 2005 (Tompson, 2004).
6In constructing the pay-oﬀs for deciding whether a loan of last resort should
be granted, one would then also take into account how the design of the
regulatory scheme aﬀects a bank’s risk-taking choices.
In a subsequent paper, Repullo (2003) takes up the issue of the extent
to which the presence of a LLR enhances bank risk-taking. He ﬁnds that
the presence of a LLR in itself does not necessarily imply greater risk-taking,
but rather that a bank’s appetite for risk-taking is stepped up when penalty
rates are charged. Again, the paper says little about supervision as such.
There is only a consistently enforced capital rule. Unsurprisingly, the fact
that the Russian banking market is subject to prudential rules carries little
weight in bank portfolio decisions when banks do not expect the rules will be
enforced. In other words, an increase in enforcement is one straightforward
way to get banks to incorporate supervision into their decisionmaking and
diminish their propensity for risk-taking.
Kahn and Santos (2001) parallel the argument in Repullo (2000) and use
the assumption that banks have the discretion to divert funds to more risky
investments. In a setting with a uniﬁed regulator, the authors ﬁnd a) ex-
cessive regulatory forbearance, b) insuﬃcient monitoring and c) sub-optimal
investment in loans. One crucial assumption is that the single regulator lacks
the arbitrary authority to close a bank. A bank is only closed when the regu-
lator decides not to lend to the bank when it faces a liquidity shortfall. When
the regulator has full authority to close banks (on top of the power to extract
rents from the bank under all circumstances), the bank loses all incentives to
invest in illiquid assets. The authors argue that regulatory forbearance can
be reduced by setting speciﬁed loan rates for the LLR and giving the DIA
authority to shut down banks. Alternatively, they suggest both the central
bank and the DIA could act as a LLR (see Repullo, 2000). The ﬁrst solution
does not clarify to which extent banks will be tempted to take on more risk,
nor what happens with the degree of bank monitoring by the supervisory
agency.
The results in Kahn and Santos (2001) oﬀer some insights into the impli-
cations of the CBR’s arrangements. They argue that when the central bank
assumes all responsibilities, including the authority to close banks (as the
CBR), there will be excessive regulatory forbearance, insuﬃcient monitoring
and a sub-optimal level of lending. This is a valid appraisal of the current
situation in Russia. Lending ﬁgures remain low by international standards12
and empirical evidence suggests low levels of monitoring and enforcement
of regulations (Claeys et al., 2005). The emphasis, therefore, needs to go
to regulatory enforcement. In fact, if the regulator fails to credibly commit
12See e.g. the data on loans in Tompson (2004) and Chowdhury (2003).
7to closing banks, risk-taking behaviour increases regardless of which agency
assumes authority.13 Indeed, when banks can count on the regulatory for-
bearance of the central bank, they are prone to assume risk and expect to
be bailed out when they get into trouble. This is costly in terms of failure of
loans or investments, which inevitably entails a loss of funds that could have
been allocated more eﬃciently.
Supervision and monetary policy
The potential conﬂict between monetary policy and supervision arises
when supervisory information impacts monetary policy so that decisions defy
(or follow) what is commanded by economic conditions and favour (or dis-
favour) bank balances. A supervisor sometimes needs to act as protector or
stern disciplinarian, but either stance can conﬂict with monetary policy in
certain conditions. Such conﬂict becomes apparent, e.g. in the case where
monetary policy needs to be tightened, but bank balances are weak. On the
other hand, when the central bank has an external monetary objective such
as an exchange rate target, its policy may harm individual bank stability
(Goodhart, 2000). This is clearly the case when monetary policy is used to
hold depreciation pressure at bay by increasing interest rates. Indeed, this
characterises much of the CBR’s policy in the post-1998 crisis period, when
Rb depreciation against the USD forced the CBR to keep interest rates high.
More recently, high oil prices and a declining USD led to Rb appreciation,
and motivated the Russian government in April 2004 to impose a limit on
Rb appreciation against a USD/EUR currency basket. With an appreciating
currency, interest rates can be lowered, even if internal inﬂationary pres-
sures suggest a higher rate is necessary. Such a stance helps banks without
endangering their individual stability.
If monetary policy transmission is assumed to work through the bank
channel, the conﬂicts that arise will be more acute. Particularly in the case
where bank loan portfolios are characterised by a massive maturity mismatch,
so that any increase in interest rates negatively impacts bank proﬁtability.
On the other hand, when banks are mainly ﬁnanced with retail deposits, con-
ﬂicts are less likely since these interest rates are unlikely to follow large short-
term swings in the money market. The potential conﬂict between supervision
and monetary policy therefore depends on the structure of the banking sys-
13In general, these papers do not consider the conﬂicts of interest arising from assuming
all three functions of a supervisory authority (LLR, deposit insurer and closure authority).
To look at the conﬂict-of-interest problem, one needs to deﬁne which aspect of policy holds
top priority for the central bank — something that is not always immediately apparent.
Only when the relative importance of diﬀerent functions is deﬁned can one interpret or
build an appropriate utility function. Obviously, priorities can also shift over time.
8tem. Russian bank portfolios are characterised by their short-term nature in
both assets and liabilities (see e.g. Chowdhury, 2003). Although the term
structure of loans to the private sector is gradually lengthening, short-term
loans must often be rolled over because of the lack of long-term funding.14
Despite the low level of long-term loans, the inability of Russian banks to
attract long-term liabilities generates a maturity mismatch that makes the
sector vulnerable to interest rate changes.
Next to the conﬂicting objectives of exchange rate stability and low in-
ﬂation, the combination of supervisory powers and monetary policy may
change expectations with respect to the stance of monetary policy, which
in turn impacts how banks behave. If central banks use supervisory infor-
mation in monetary decisionmaking, combining the tasks of supervision and
monetary policy may have its advantages and can be used to maintain ﬁ-
nancial stability. CBR concerns about ﬁnancial stability may explain why it
has resorted to regulatory forbearance in its supervisory function. As this
should be visible in its conduct of monetary policy, I empirically investigate
this notion in section 3.
Lessons for the CBR
The theoretical literature on regulatory structure has to be interpreted
carefully in the developing market cases such as Russia. The quality of pub-
lished information is often quite poor and the legal system may be too weak
to coordinate the various functions of the central bank and the supervisor.
When accounting rules are inadequate and give rise to window-dressing and
creative accounting, regulations may turn out to be meaningless and super-
vision void altogether, no matter where it is done. In such a situation, one
needs to assess how supervision can be rendered eﬀective before addressing
the optimal allocation of regulatory powers. Given the low enforcement of
prudential regulation in Russia, one can arguably defend keeping a FSA in-
house the CBR. However, when supervisory information adequately reﬂects
banking sector health, a central bank can use this information to carry out
its monetary policy decisions and to optimally balance its act as a LLR. The
supervisory authority can therefore be delegated to an outside oﬃce which
is less prone to political pressure nor suﬀers from an inherent inconsistency
in its objective function, while allowing the central bank access to this infor-
mation. This should improve diﬃculties in enforcement and allow a central
bank to preserve ﬁnancial stability. In a fragile banking system, this may
be one of the central bank’s primary concerns. In Russia, however, it might
14This is because all deposits, regardless of their maturity, are demand deposits by law.
The CBR is looking into a law that would make term deposits possible (Tompson, 2004).
9turn out that the CBR is only concerned with the stability of state-owned
banks.
Empirical assessment of inconsistencies
To date, empirical assessments of the possible costs of improperly de-
signing a central bank’s powers or functions are fairly limited. The main
questions that need to be addressed are:
1. Does the current design lead to regulatory forbearance?
2. Does regulatory forbearance lead to increased risk-taking by banks?
3. What are the beneﬁts of “in-house” supervisory information for LLR
functions?
4. How does “in-house” supervisory information beneﬁt monetary policy?
Claeys et al. (2005a) empirically investigate how well the CBR enforced
its prudential regulations and provide evidence of a signiﬁcant degree of regu-
latory forbearance. Claeys et al. (2005b) investigate theoretically and empir-
ically how the interplay between a repressive form of monetary policy and su-
pervision can negatively impact risk behaviour of Russian banks. Goodhart
and Schoenmaker (1995) analyse whether supervision should be separated
from monetary policy through the investigation of bank failures under dif-
ferent regimes. Their empirical evidence suggests that a system of combined
arrangement experiences signiﬁcant fewer failures compared to a separate
arrangement (although the question remains as whether such a system is
more eﬃcient). Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999) ﬁnd that inﬂation rates are
higher and more volatile in countries where supervisory functions are housed
entirely inside the central bank. Peek et al. (1999) investigate the role of su-
pervision in central banking for the United States. Their results indicate that
while inﬂation and unemployment forecasts can be improved using supervi-
sory information, the latter does not aﬀect the Federal Reserve’s monetary
policy through staﬀ forecasts. Supervisory information does, however, signif-
icantly inﬂuence the monetary decisions made through voting behaviour by
members of the Federal Open Market Committee. This paper follows a sim-
ilar approach and addresses the question of whether supervisory information
is useful for the conduct of monetary policy in Russia in preserving ﬁnan-
cial stability. Since the CBR does not report any inﬂation or unemployment
forecasts nor publishes any decision discussions or votes of members of its
monetary board, I investigate whether supervisory information contributes
to the understanding of observed monetary policy behaviour in Russia.
103 I ss u p e r v i s i o nc e n t r a lt ot h eC e n t r a lB a n k
of Russia?
This section provides a preliminary and necessarily limited empirical answer
to the question of whether prudential supervision is useful for the conduct
of monetary policy in the Russian Federation. Does “hands-on” supervisory
information guide monetary policy decisions of the Russian central bank?
Does supervisory information add signiﬁcantly to our understanding of cen-
tral bank behaviour by improving the performance of benchmark rules based
on this wider information set?
A simple Taylor rule can often be used as a benchmark to assess the mon-
etary policy decisions made by the central bank.15 In the ﬁrst step, I analyse
whether the policy of the CBR can be described adequately using modiﬁed
versions of the original Taylor rule. In the second step, I investigate what a
benchmark Taylor rule would look like if the CBR would use the widest in-
formation set available, including supervisory information. For this purpose,
I assume that the central bank observes current and past inﬂation, interest
rates, actual and potential output and the exchange rate. I assess how this
information aﬀects the forward-looking behaviour of the central bank.16 I
assume the central bank has “hands-on” supervisory information, available
only to the public with a lag. To gauge the usefulness of supervisory infor-
mation, I analyse how this information may help to improve the performance
o ft h eT a y l o rr u l ea sab e n c h m a r kf o rm o n e t a r yp o l i c y .
3.1 A Taylor rule tailored to the CBR
Methodology
Given the CBR’s explicit exchange rate stability objective, I apply an
open economy version of the Taylor rule.17 Based on Taylor’s original rule
(1993) and interest rate smoothing, I assume that the following equation
describes central bank behaviour in the Russian Federation:
15This has been extensively documented for the US and later Germany and the Euro
Area. See e.g. Clarida and Gertler (1996), Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998), Rudebush
and Svensson (1998) and Peersman and Smets (1999).
16Assuming forward-looking behaviour on the part of the CBR may be overdoing it for
some parts of the estimation sample. I characterise monetary policy as if the CBR was
forward-looking in its policies throughout the entire sample period.
17The CBR’s 2003 annual report states: “The main objectives and principles of the
monetary policy pursued by the Bank of Russia in 2003, as in the previous years, were
determined by the task of consistently reducing the inﬂation rate and ensuring the national
currency’s stability to bring about growth in real income, savings and investment and
create conditions for long term sustainable economic growth.”
11it =( 1 − λ) · i
0




∗ + γ1 · [Et {πt+n} − π
∗]+γ2 · [Et {ipt − ip
∗
t}]+γ3 · ∆eet, (2)
where it is the central bank’s instrument rate and i∗ is the long-term nominal
equilibrium interest rate, consistent with the inﬂation target π∗. Et {πt+n}
is the expected annual inﬂation rate for the period between t and t + n,
conditional upon the information set available at time t, ipt (ip∗
t) is the log
of monthly (potential) industrial production18 and ∆eet is the log diﬀerence
of the monthly exchange rate.19 Following Clarida and Gertler (1996) and
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998), i0
t is the central bank’s target rate which
reacts to changes in expected inﬂation,20 t h eo u t p u tg a pa n dt h ee ﬀective
exchange rate. νt can be interpreted as a shock parameter which prevents
the CBR from setting the rate according to the rule or as a deliberate policy
shock by the CBR which wants to deviate from the rule. According to
equation (1), I assume that each month the central bank sets the interest
rate as a convex combination of the target rate and the lagged interest rate
to capture how the actual rate partially adjusts towards the target.
For estimation purposes, equation (1) is rewritten as follows:
it =( 1− λ)·[γ0 + γ1 · πt+n + γ2 · (ipt − ip
∗
t)+γ3 · ∆eet]+λ·it−1 +µt, (3)
where µt = −(1 − λ)[γ1 (πt+n − Et {πt+n})+γ2 (ipt − ip∗
t − Et {ipt − ip∗
t})]+
νt, γ0 = i∗ −γ1 ·π∗.G i v e nt h a tµt is a linear combination of forecast errors,
it is orthogonal to all variables known by the CBR at time t when setting
the interest rate. Further assume that ivt is a vector of variables within the
central bank’s information set such that Et [µt|ivt]=0holds.
Monetary policy in Russia
18I apply a quadratic trend to industrial production to obtain an estimate of the long-
term trend component ip∗
t.
19I use the Rb/USD exchange rate, but investigate the impact of changes in the nominal
eﬀective exchange rate as well. The CBR recently announced it will abandon dollar tar-
geting in its managed ﬂoat policy for the ruble and switch to a USD/EUR currency basket
(see BOFIT Weekly 6, 11.2.2005). For the period under consideration, the Rb/USD rate
was mainly targeted.
20This is a generalisation of the original rule ﬁrst proposed by Taylor (1993), whereby
the central bank responds to lagged inﬂa t i o nr a t h e rt h a nt oe x p e c t e di n ﬂation. Clarida
et al. (1998) argue that an advantage of this speciﬁcation is that it implicitly reﬂects the
reality of policymaking, namely that a central bank takes into account the broadest set of
information available. Even so, I have included tests that allow for a policy that reacts to
past inﬂation to assess the “forward-looking-ness” of the CBR’s stance.
12I use monthly data for the period (1996:11—2003:08). I assume that the
C B R ’ sm o n e t a r yp o l i c ys t a n c ei sr e ﬂected in movements of the money market
rate. Figure 1 graphs the CBR’s reﬁnancing rate together with movements
in the money market rate. The money market rate almost always falls below
the reﬁnancing rate set by the CBR (with the exception of 1997:12 and
1998:9—1998:10). After the 1998 crisis, the gap is gradually reduced. The
m o n e ym a r k e tr a t em a yn o tp e r f e c t l yr e ﬂect monetary policy as intended
by the CBR but I consider it the best reﬂection of the monetary policy
stance.21 I use the annualised monthly inﬂation rate for consumer prices as
the CBR’s inﬂation target (adapted from Goskomstat). For the forward-
looking Taylor rule, I assume that the CBR is concerned with the one-year
ahead inﬂation rate, n =1 2 , rather than the month-to-month variation in
inﬂation.22 Because of a possible endogeneity bias,23 I use a non-linear GMM
estimation procedure to estimate the coeﬃcients.
[Insert Figure 1]
Table 1 presents the estimation results for equation (3) when using monthly
data for the period (1996:11—2003:08).24 In the baseline equation, I use the
current output gap and ex-post values of inﬂation. The ﬁrst line shows the
results for the baseline speciﬁcation when accounting for movements in the
Rb/USD exchange rate. The coeﬃcient on the inﬂation gap, γ1,i n d i c a t e s
that a 1 per cent rise in one year ahead expected inﬂation will induce the
CBR to raise nominal interest rates with 40 basis points. The CBR does not
seem to succeed in raising real rates in response to inﬂationary pressures.25
The coeﬃcient on the output gap is negative and signiﬁcant. It indicates
that a 1 per cent increase in industrial production compared to its quadratic
trend leads the CBR to reduce nominal (and real) rates by 33 basis points,
indicating pro-cyclical interest-rate behaviour on the part of the CBR. This
result is corroborated when including alternative measures for the output
21Others have estimated monetary policy rules for the CBR for several subperiods as-
suming alternative instruments. See e.g. Esanov et al. (2004).
22I use data up to 2004:12 for this purpose. The CBR only recently started reporting
target rates for inﬂation (see CBR annual reports from 1997, when the shift to a form of
inﬂation targeting oﬃcially started).
23The CBR may react to changes in inﬂation and output by adjusting the interest rate,
which may in turn impact how these variables behave.
24Both inﬂation and interest rates are I(0). DF tests of the null of I(1) or non-stationarity
are always rejected.
25This is because γ1 is not signiﬁcantly larger than 1. This is consistent with the ﬁndings
in Esanov et al. (2004).
13gap, using either a Hodrick Prescott smoothing ﬁlter to detrend industrial
production or a ﬁve-sector production measure (see lines 2 to 4).
To account for the CBR’s exchange rate stability objective with respect
to the USD, I add the Rb/USD exchange rate in the baseline equation and
the instrument set. The results indicate that a 1 per cent depreciation of
t h eR br e l a t i v et ot h eU S Di n d u c e sa0 . 9 4p e rc e n ti n c r e a s ei nt h et a r g e t
rate (0.94*0.6 increase in the money market rate). This corroborates the
view that the CBR follows an appreciation policy with respect to the USD.
The Russian money market rate decreased signiﬁcantly, however, in response
to a depreciation in the trade-weighted exchange rate (see line 5). This is
explained by the fact that while the CBR was targeting the Rb/USD by
increasing rates following depreciation, the Rb was appreciating against a
trade-weighted basket of currencies (see Figure 2).
[Insert Table 1]
[Insert Figure 2]
Finally, I add current and lagged inﬂation and oil prices to the equation.
Although current inﬂation does not enter signiﬁcantly, lagged inﬂation and
current oil prices negatively inﬂuence the interest rate. The observation that
the coeﬃcient on the output gap is unstable across speciﬁcations casts some
doubt on whether monetary policy of the CBR can be described as partial
output-targeting. Diﬃculties in observing the output gap, especially on a
monthly basis, reinforces this suspicion. Furthermore, estimation error in
the output gap typically leads to overestimation of its reaction coeﬃcient
(Peersman and Smets, 1999), such that even for signiﬁcant γ2, its economic
impact cannot be exaggerated.
The J-statistic indicates that we cannot reject the overidentifying restric-
tions in any of the speciﬁcations. Figure 3 plots the actual rate versus the
implied target rate for the baseline equation.
[Insert Figure 3]
3.2 Bank supervision and monetary policy
To capture the CBR’s prior knowledge of individual bank health acquired
through supervision, I construct several monthly aggregate “bank sector in-
dices” (BSI) to reﬂect the banking sector’s health. I focus initially on pri-
vate banks and exclude balance sheet movements from state-owned banks
(SOBs).26 Next, I include SOBs in assessing aggregate banking health and
26The three state-owned banks are Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank and Vnesheconombank.
14investigate SOBs’ balance sheet movements separately. I assume that in
each month t, the CBR uses the widest information set possible to gauge
individual and aggregate bank health. Figure 4 illustrates the sequence of
information arrival at the CBR.
[Insert Figure 4]
At the beginning of each month t, the CBR observes ﬁnancial information
of all banks at time t0 which reﬂects balance sheet andi n c o m es t a t e m e n t
information for the previous month t−1. A tt h ee n do fe a c hm o n t ht,a t
time te, the number of bank failures for month t is known. At time te all
information from month t can be used to calculate an individual bank’s
failure probability. Based on the estimation results of an aggregate failure
prediction model I obtain:27
1. an aggregate coeﬃcient vector, ˆ β, which I use to construct
2. bank-speciﬁc failure probabilities, ˆ pi,t (predicted failure probabilities
scaled between 0 and 100), which reﬂect each bank i’s failure probability
at time t, based on ﬁnancial information FI of month t−1 observed at
t0.
To obtain an aggregate bank “stress” indicator, I construct an unweighted







where It is the number of banks still operative in month t.H i g h e rl e v e l so fPt
will indicate higher average vulnerability of the banking sector. Of course, it
is unlikely that the CBR would take such an average at face value in assessing
the banking sector’s health. More likely, the CBR would consider the size
and interbank linkages of banks most likely to fail. I therefore construct an
aggregate indicator that takes into account the CBR’s concern over those
banks that are most likely to fail and represent some sort of systemic threat
in the event of their failure. Assume that the CBR focuses on the cumulative
market share of bank assets (or interbank liabilities) held by banks most
likely to fail and deﬁne:
27More detailed information on the estimation results for the failure prediction model







i|ˆ pi,t > 90th percentile of ˆ pt
ª
, ˆ pt = {ˆ p1,t, ˆ p2,t,...,ˆ pIt,t} and
MSi,t is the market share of bank i in month t in total bank assets (or
interbank liabilities). BSIt then captures the cumulative market share (either
in terms of assets or interbank liabilities) of the 10 per cent of banks most
likely to fail. When the CBR uses this information in the conduct of monetary
policy, higher values for BSIt are expected to lead to lower interest rates to
ease bank balances. To account for the possibility that the CBR may also be
concerned with large banks in terms of assets (or interbank liabilities) but
smaller failure probabilities, I further test how interest rates behave when






ωi,t · ˆ pi,t,
where ωi,t is bank i’s assets (or interbank liabilities) in total assets (or in-
terbank liabilities) in month t.I u s e w e i g h t s t h a t r e ﬂect either regional or
national market shares.
To test the hypothesis that the CBR is using supervisory information in
its conduct of monetary policy, I include another target variable, BSI,w i t h
coeﬃcient γ4 in equation (3). Table 2 presents the results for the benchmark
Taylor rule when including supervisory information through diﬀerent mea-
sures of poor bank health when excluding SOB balances. Table 3 includes
SOB balances in the construction of the BSIs and adds an extra line that
only takes into account the SOBs’ average failure probability (as opposed
to overall banking sector vulnerability). Line 1 reproduces the baseline es-
timation with the monthly Rb/USD exchange rate. Lines 2 and 3 present
t h er e s u l t sw h e na g g r e g a t eb a n kh e a l t hi sp r o x i e db yt h ec u m u l a t i v em a r k e t
share of banks most likely to fail. The results indicate that a rise in BSI
through increased asset shares of the most troubled banks signiﬁcantly re-
duces the money market rate. Furthermore, a deterioration of bank balances
with large regional shares in assets or interbank linkages (no matter if SOBs
are included) also leads to an easing of monetary policy (lines 4 and 5). This
suggests that a deterioration in bank health of those banks with systemic
importance (in terms of assets or regional coverage) results in an easing of
monetary policy by the CBR. This is in line with the results of Peek et al.
(1999) for the US Federal Reserve and corroborates the ﬁndings in Claeys
et al. (2005a). However, the results for interbank liability shares in line 3
16suggest otherwise. Furthermore, when private banks’ failure probability is
weighted against national shares in assets or interbank linkages, a worsening
of bank health leads to a strengthening of monetary policy or no change (see
lines 6 and 7 in Table 2). The results for the unweighted failure probabilities
support these ﬁndings. Nonetheless, once SOBs are included, the nationally
weighted BSI has a signiﬁcant negative impact on monetary policy. This
result is supported when only the SOBs’ average health is included (see line
8 in Table 3), indicating that the CBR puts particular emphasis on SOBs’
balance health and thereby impacts monetary policy.
The empirical evidence presented suggests that monetary policy has been
eased somewhat to favour bank balances solely to accommodate sizeable
banks and state-owned banks with high failure probabilities. A variety of
other measures capturing commercial bank health suggest that the CBR is
otherwise not particularly prone to ease monetary policy to promote banking
sector stability.
3.3 Extensions for future research
In all estimations, I assume that the CBR’s monetary policy can be best un-
derstood via forward-looking versions of the Taylor rule using ex post realised
values for inﬂation rather than inﬂation forecasts. One alternative procedure
adds forward-looking measures of inﬂation directly into the equation. Here,
one could use actual forecasts rather than assuming (less realistically) ratio-
nal expectations on behalf of the CBR. Inﬂation forecasts can be generated
under the assumption that the CBR uses the widest information set avail-
able by estimating a macroeconomic model of the Russian economy through
e.g. SVAR analysis. Identiﬁcation of the empirical model, however, requires
imposing restrictions on the dynamic behaviour of structural shocks. Fur-
thermore, the reliability of the SVAR analysis hinges upon the absence of
structural breaks and relative long data availability — two conditions hardly
met by Russia at this time. Moreover, even with better data quality, it may
be inappropriate to assume the CBR “knows the model” and uses forecasts
of inﬂation and output. The CBR still does not publish inﬂation forecasts; it
only started to publish inﬂa t i o n( a n di m p l i e do u t p u tg r o w t hr a t e )t a r g e t si n
1997.28 Thus, an intriguing question remains: How useful would supervisory
information be to the CBR if it were to use inﬂation forecasts?
28Inﬂation targets are published yearly in “Guidelines for the Single State Monetary
Policy.”
174 Concluding Remarks
The empirical results in this paper suggest that although supervisory in-
formation may be useful for monetary policy behaviour, it only marginally
improves our understanding of what determines monetary policy in Russia.
Do these results help answer the question of where supervision eﬀorts should
be directed? And more importantly, even when supervision can potentially
contribute to monetary policy, how successful has the CBR been in main-
taining ﬁnancial stability through its use of supervisory information in the
conduct of monetary policy? The CBR has mainly pursued an exchange
rate target vis-a-vis the USD — to the detriment rather than improvement of
bank balances — and has only recently started to target inﬂation seriously.
Using a simple Taylor rule framework, I found that the CBR does not use
its “hands-on” supervisory information to maintain overall ﬁnancial stabil-
ity, but rather to accommodate state-owned banks’ balances. On one hand,
this implies that one should not be too worried that commercial banks can
successfully put pressure on the CBR. However, since the evidence indicates
that the CBR essentially caters to the needs of larger banks (particularly
regionally important and state-owned banks), there is deﬁnitely a conﬂict
within the CBR’s objective function. Moreover, despite privatisation com-
mitments, state shareholdings in the banking sector rose after the 1998 crisis
and the decision to privatise Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank was postponed
until 2007. In addition, low enforcement of prudential regulation and the
CBR’s inability to maintain banking system stability (e.g. the 1998 ﬁnancial
crisis and deposit runs in the summer of 2004) call into question the rationale
for keeping supervision in-house at the CBR.
A Constructing an aggregate Russian Bank
Sector Index (BSI)
I estimate a failure probability model to identify a set of variables (with their
respective weights) that capture the ﬁnancial soundness of banks. The US
Federal Reserve determines a CAMEL rating for banks as part of its early
warning system to reﬂect the degree of individual bank health. CAMEL
ratings are based upon a set of variables that reﬂect a bank’s Capital ad-
equacy, Asset quality, general Management and governance, Earnings and
Liquidity management. Based on the monthly Mobile database for the period
1995:11—2003:8, I construct a number of variables that reﬂect the CAMEL
rating categories as closely as possible. My choice of variables is, however,
restricted due to the need for monthly frequency and subsequent availabil-
18ity of the data. The variables which are included for estimating the failure
probability model using logit estimation are described in Table A1. The de-
pendent variable in the logit regression is a dummy variable, failure, which
equals one if a bank’s license is revoked before 2003:8, and zero otherwise.
Because there can be a signiﬁcant lag between “economic failure” and “regu-
latory failure” (the CBR’s de-licensing behaviour),29 I restrict the estimation
sample to banks which have positive equity and a non-working assets ratio
below 100 per cent. I further assume, after estimation, that those banks
which have negative capital and/or have a non-working assets ratio of over
100 per cent have a failure probability of 0.99. Summary statistics of the
variables in the estimation sample are presented in Table A2 for private and
state-owned banks (SOBs) separately. Next to CAMEL related variables, I
also include a market share and concentration measure in the speciﬁcation.
Figure 5 plots the monthly number of failures included in the estimation
sample.
[Insert Figure 5]
The variable set should be based on the widest information set available
to the CBR as well as capture the CBR’s private knowledge of bank health
compared to public awareness. One drawback of the current variable set is
that it cannot appropriately account for qualitative measures such as the
management and governance policy of a bank (information which is typi-
cally obtainable in conjunction with on-site examinations by the supervisory
authority). Unfortunately, since the CBR does not publish bank ratings,
I cannot extract this private information. Instead, I can only assume that
part of the unobserved component of the estimated default probability re-
ﬂects this unobserved information. Furthermore, since I estimate the weights
based on the whole period for which I observe the variables (1995:11 - 2003:8),
I implicitly assume that the CBR has forward-looking information on banks’
balances.
The estimation results for the logit model are summarised in Table A3.30,31
Banks with high loans-to-assets and non-government-loan ratios have higher
29Licenses were often not withdrawn until the banks were already illiquid and stripped
of assets. See Schoors, 1999.
30The results here are for the sample excluding the three state-owned banks. Results
that included SOBs are, however, quite similar and are available upon request.
31In contrast to the default models for Russian banks estimated in Peresetsky et al.
(2004), I use the entire time series to estimate the weights for the calculation of individual
bank failure probability.
19failure probabilities, which is indicative of the risks involved when invest-
ing in the Russian economy (see van Soest et al., 2003). Banks with high
capital adequacy and a low share of non-working assets have lower failure
probabilities. Sizeable banks, banks with a high market share and banks
that operate in highly concentrated markets (high Herﬁndahl index) all have
lower failure probabilities. The coeﬃcients of the model are used as weights
to predict monthly, bank-speciﬁc, failure probabilities and are assumed to
reﬂect individual bank health based on the CBR’s knowledge at the end of
each month.
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22TABLE 1
CBR Reaction Functions: Forward Looking Modiﬁed Taylor Rules
λγ 0 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 J-stat Chi2
Baseline (Rb/USD)1 0.63 1.19 0.40 -0.33 0.94 0.14 11.30
0.03 1.32 0.05 0.05 0.12 (0.96)
Alternative output gap:
HP16002 0.79 -2.16 0.56 -1.42 1.23 0.16 12.94
0.03 2.34 0.09 0.31 0.17 (0.91)
HP144003 0.70 1.39 0.37 -0.40 1.42 0.15 12.60
0.03 1.80 0.08 0.07 0.15 (0.92)
IP54 0.63 3.39 0.44 -0.54 1.75 0.13 10.10
0.04 1.61 0.07 0.10 0.20 (0.98)
Alternative ER:
NEER5 0.66 -4.11 0.62 0.24 -2.46 0.14 11.86
0.03 1.81 0.08 0.06 0.23 (0.94)
Baseline extended with6:
current inﬂation7 0.62 -1.06 0.42 -0.26 1.00 0.03 0.12 10.17
0.03 1.62 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.02 (0.97)
lagged inﬂation8 0.49 0.67 0.53 0.12 1.79 -0.07 0.13 10.52
0.02 1.15 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.01 (0.97)
producer prices9 0.70 0.22 0.42 -0.17 1.68 -0.44 0.15 11.97
- f u e l 0 . 0 21 . 4 8 0 . 0 50 . 0 40 . 1 30 . 0 8 (0.99)
Note: The dependent variable is the monthly average of the daily money market rate (IFS). For each
element z in the instrument set ivt the following lags are included: zt−1,...,z t−6,z t−9,z t−12.T h e
baseline instrument set ivt includes lagged values of inﬂation, output gap, exchange rate and money
market rate. A quadratic trend of industrial production is used to proxy for the monthly outputgap.
All equations include 6 dummy variables that account for the august 1998 crisis (1998:7 - 1998:12).
The sample period is 1996:11 - 2003:8. The number of observations is 82. Standard errors in italics.
Chi2 provides a test for overidentifying restrictions. Under the null hypothesis that the overidentifying
restrictions are satisﬁed, the test statistic is asymptotically Chi-squared distributed with the number
of overidentifying restrictions as degrees of freedom. P-values in parentheses.
1 The log diﬀerence of end-of-month Rb Dollar ER (IFS)
2 Outputgap using Hodrick Prescott ﬁlter on industrial production (λ = 1600)
3 Outputgap using Hodrick Prescott ﬁlter on industrial production (λ = 14400)
4 Outputgap using production of 5 basic industrial sectors: industrial production, construction,
agriculture, transportation and retail trade (Goskomstat; period is 1997:1 - 2003:8)
5 The log diﬀerence of the nominal eﬀective ER (IFS)
6 For each extra variable included, the instrument set ivt is expanded with its lagged values.
7 γ4 is the coeﬃcient on πt
8 γ4 is the coeﬃcient on πt−12
9 γ4 is the coeﬃcient on the monthly annualised inﬂation rate of producer prices - fuel (Goskomstat)
23TABLE 2
CBR Reaction Functions: The Role of Supervisory Information in Monetary Policy
(SOB excluded)
λγ 0 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 J-stat Chi2
Baseline (Rb/USD) 0.63 1.19 0.40 -0.33 0.94 0.14 11.30
0.03 1.32 0.05 0.05 0.12 (0.96)
including1:
BSI
assets 0.72 4.28 1.17 0.32 1.86 -0.05 0.17 13.66
0.03 1.86 0.09 0.05 0.19 0.01 (0.99)
interbank liabilities 0.82 -4.44 0.45 -0.36 1.01 0.01 0.19 15.27
0.02 2.24 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.00 (0.98)
WBSI
Regional:
assets 0.72 5.13 1.11 0.29 1.48 -0.41 0.17 14.06
0.03 1.79 0.09 0.05 0.22 0.05 (0.99)
interbank liabilities 0.65 10.20 0.86 0.20 3.02 -0.45 0.19 15.63
0.02 1.48 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.04
National: (0.97)
assets 0.60 0.86 0.24 0.00 0.93 8.60 0.19 15.47
0.02 0.66 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.35 (0.97)
interbank liabilities 0.75 -2.50 0.49 -0.28 0.77 1.18 0.18 14.78
0.02 1.77 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.85 (0.98)
P 0.41 -3.54 0.06 0.04 0.98 0.74 0.20 16.53
0.02 0.80 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.05 (0.96)
Note: The dependent variable is the monthly average of the daily money market rate (IFS). For
each element z in the instrument set ivt the following lags are included: zt−1,...,z t−6,z t−9,z t−12.
T h eb a s e l i n ei n s t r u m e n ts e tivt includes lagged values of inﬂation, output gap, exchange rate and
money market rate. A quadratic trend of industrial production is used to proxy for the monthly
outputgap. All equations include 6 dummy variables that account for the august 1998 crisis (1998:7
- 1998:12). The sample period is 1996:11 - 2003:8. The number of observations is 82. Standard
errors in italics. Chi2 provides a test for overidentifying restrictions. Under the null hypothesis
that the overidentifying restrictions are satisﬁed, the test statistic is asymptotically Chi-squared
distributed with the number of overidentifying restrictions as degrees of freedom. P-values in
parentheses.
1 For each extra variable included, the instrument set ivt is expanded with its lagged values.
24TABLE 3
CBR Reaction Functions: The Role of Supervisory Information in Monetary Policy
(SOB included)
λγ 0 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 J-stat Chi2
Baseline (Rb/USD) 0.63 1.19 0.40 -0.33 0.94 0.14 11.30
0.03 1.32 0.05 0.05 0.12 (0.96)
Including1:
BSI
assets 0.70 6.95 1.02 0.25 1.91 -0.04 0.18 15.00
0.03 1.98 0.07 0.04 0.20 0.01 (0.98)
interbank liabilities 0.44 -0.46 0.23 -0.14 1.64 0.01 0.19 15.77
0.02 0.96 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.00 (0.97)
WBSI
Regional:
assets 0.70 7.69 1.21 0.22 1.68 -0.46 0.18 14.44
0.03 1.84 0.12 0.04 0.19 0.05 (0.98)
interbank liabilities 0.64 10.51 0.85 0.20 2.96 -0.45 0.19 15.68
0.02 1.52 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.04 (0.97)
National:
assets 0.68 1.86 0.48 -0.33 0.77 -0.32 0.19 15.94
0.02 1.09 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.15 (0.97)
interbank liabilities 0.79 0.90 0.70 -0.24 1.89 -5.03 0.19 15.65
0.02 1.85 0.06 0.04 0.23 0.74
(0.97)
P 0.41 -3.74 0.06 0.04 0.97 0.75 0.20 16.51
0.02 0.80 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.05 (0.96)
SOB2 0.36 1.94 0.46 -0.06 1.34 -5.07 0.21 13.97
0.01 0.54 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.87 (0.99)
Note: The dependent variable is the monthly average of the daily money market rate (IFS). For each
element z in the instrument set ivt the following lags are included: zt−1,...,z t−6,z t−9,z t−12.T h e
baseline instrument set ivt includes lagged values of inﬂation, output gap, exchange rate and money
market rate. A quadratic trend of industrial production is used to proxy for the monthly output gap.
All equations include 6 dummy variables that account for the August 1998 crisis (1998:7 - 1998:12).
The sample period is 1996:11 - 2003:8. The number of observations is 82. Standard errors in italics.
Chi2 provides a test for overidentifying restrictions. Under the null hypothesis that the overidentifying
restrictions are satisﬁed, the test statistic is asymptotically Chi-squared distributed with the number
of overidentifying restrictions as degrees of freedom. P-values in parentheses.
1 For each extra variable included, the instrument set ivt is expanded with its lagged values.
2 γ4 is the coeﬃcient on the average failure probability of the state-owned banks only.
25TABLE A1
Description of Variables for the Logit Model1
Capital/assets The capital-to-assets ratio of bank i in month t (%).
Non-working assets/assets The ratio of non-working assets in total assets
of bank i in month t (%).
Return on assets The ratio of monthly net income to two-month
a v e r a g eo fa s s e t so fb a n ki in month t (%).
Liquidity The ratio of liquid assets in total assets of bank i
in month t (%).
Non-government claims/assets The ratio of non-government securities in total
assets of bank i in month t (%).
Loans/assets The loans (to non-ﬁnancial institutions)-to-assets
ratio of bank i in month t (%).
Size (log assets) The log of assets of bank i in month t.
Regional2 market share (assets) The regional market share in assets, calculated as the
ratio of bank i’s individual assets to the sum of bank
assets for region j in month t (between 0 and 100).
Regional2 Herﬁndahl (assets) The regional Herﬁndahl index, calculated as the
sum of squared regional market shares for each
region j in month t (between 0 and 10000).
1 Source: Own calculations based on Mobile database.
2 Note: I use 80 regions for the calculation of regional market shares.
26Table A2
Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SOB Private SOB Private SOB Private SOB Private
Capital/assets 17.03 32.47 13.71 20.47 0.03 0.00 41.11 99.99
Non-working assets/assets 17.94 12.73 14.99 14.87 6.07 0.00 69.19 99.97
Net Return on Assets 0.04 0.07 1.53 3.15 -7.32 -137.63 5.09 147.64
Liquidity 5.98 22.37 3.96 18.72 0.01 0.00 20.33 99.76
Non-government claims/assets 4.19 11.09 3.94 15.87 0.00 0.00 16.21 99.78
Loans/assets 21.57 38.12 15.36 22.61 0.64 0.00 46.15 100.00
Size (log assets) 19.43 11.62 2.02 2.00 16.50 3.61 22.66 19.26
Regional market share 24.04 5.35 30.77 13.56 0.98 0.00 88.43 100.00
Regional Herﬁndahl index 4140 3107 2158 2199 213 213 7824 10000
Source: Own calculations based on Mobile database.
Note: I use 80 regions for the calculation of regional market shares. Number of observations for SOBs is 117.
Number of observations for private banks is 100,362. Sample period is 1995:11 - 2003:8.
27Table A3
Estimation Results for the Logit Model (SOBs excluded)
Coeﬃcient Odds Mean
Estimates Ratios Values
Capital/assets -0.0140*** 0.9861 32.47
[0.0027]
Non-working assets/assets 0.0153*** 1.0154 12.73
[0.0025]
Net Return on Assets -0.0152*** 0.9849 0.07
[0.0030]
Liquidity -0.0364*** 0.9642 22.37
[0.0049]
Non-government claims/assets 0.0135*** 1.0136 11.09
[0.0038]
Loans/assets 0.0064** 1.0065 38.12
[0.0026]
Size (log assets) -0.2427*** 0.7845 11.62
[0.0360]
Regional market share (assets) -0.0264*** 0.9740 5.35
[0.0085]





Number of banks 1754
Number of months 94
Wald chi2 (9) 315.58
P-Value 0.0000
The dependent variable in the logit regression is a dummy variable, failure, which
equals one if the bank’s license was revoked before 2003:8 and zero otherwise. Sample
period is 1995:11 - 2003:8. The positive (negative) predictive value of the model is
63.86 percent (89.02 percent). 88.88 percent of the observations are correctly classi-
ﬁed. The logit estimations are performed over the pooled sample. Robust standard
errors are given in brackets (clustered on banks). *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance
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Figure 1: Reﬁnancing rate and money market rate, percentage (1996:1—
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Figure 2: Monthly average of Rb/USD exchange rate versus nominal eﬀective
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Figure 3: Target rate (γ0 + γ1 · πt+n + γ2 · (ipt − ip∗
t)+γ3 · ∆eet)v sa c t u a l
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Figure 5: Monthly number of bank failures (license revocations) (1995:11—
2003:8). Source: Mobile and CBR.
32BOFIT Discussion Papers  http://www.bof.fi/bofit 
2004  No 1  Balázs Égert: Assessing equilirium exchange rates in CEE acceding countries: Can we have DEER with 
  BEER without FEER? A critical survey of the literature 
No 2  Leena Kerkelä: Distortion costs and effects of price liberalisation in Russian energy markets:  
 A  CGE  analysis 
No 3  Julius Horvath and Stanislav Vidovic: Price variability and the speed of adjustment to the law of one price: 
 Evidence  from  Slovakia 
No 4  Pertti Haaparanta and Mikko Puhakka: Endogenous time preference, investment and development traps 
No 5  Iikka Korhonen and Paul Wachtel: Observations on disinflation in transition economies 
No 6  Eugene Nivorozhkin: Financing choices of firms in EU accession countries 
  Published in: Emerging Markets Review (2005), ISSN 1566-0141. (Forthcoming.) 
No 7  John P. Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel: Bank performance, efficiency and ownership in transition  
 Countries 
No 8  John P. Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel: Privatization matters: Bank efficiency in transition countries 
No 9   Balázs Égert and Kirsten Lommatzsch: Equilibrium exchange rates in the transition:  
  The tradable price-based real appreciation and estimation uncertainty 
No 10  Yuko Kinoshita and Nauro F. Campos: Estimating the determinants of foreign direct investment inflows: 
How important are sampling and omitted variable biases? 
No 11  Akram Esanov, Christian Merkl, Lúcio Vinhas de Souza: Monetary policy rules for Russia 
No 12  Greetje M.M. Everaert: The political economy of restructuring and subsidisation: An international perspec-
tive 
No 13  Igor Vetlov: The Lithuanian block of the ECSB multi-country model 
No 14  Michael Funke and Jörgen Rahn: Just how undervalued is the Chinese renminbi.  
Published in: World Economy (forthcoming) 
No 15  Steven Rosefielde: An abnormal country 
No 16  Juha-Pekka Koskinen, Tuuli Koivu and Abdur Chowdhury: Selecting inflation indicators under an inflation  
             targeting regime: Evidence from the MCL method 
No 17  Anna Dorbec: Liquidity provision in transition economy: the lessons from Russia 
No 18   Iikka Korhonen: Does democracy cure a resource curse?  
No 19   Bernadina Algieri: Trade specialisation patterns:The case of  Russia 
No 20   Jarko Fidrmuc and Iikka Korhonen: A meta-analysis of business cycle correlation between the euro area and 
CEECs: What do we know–and who cares?  
No 21   Anatoly Peresetsky, Alexander Karminsky and Sergei Golovan: Probability of default models of Russian 
banks. 
No 22   John Bonin and Paul Wachtel: Dealing with financial fragility in transition economies. 
2005  No 1  Pertti Haaparanta and Jukka Pirttilä: Reforms and Confidence 
No 2  Paul Wachtel and Iikka Korhonen:  A note on exchange rate pass-through in CIS  countries 
No 3     Balázs Égert: Equilibrium exchange rates in Southeastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine and Turkey: healthy or 
   (Dutch) diseased? 
No 4  Balázs Égert and László Halpern: Equilibrium exchange rates in Central and Eastern Europe: 
A meta-regression analysis 
No 5  Pingfang Zhu, Lei Li and Nannan Lundin: S&T activities and firm performance- microeconomic evidence 
  from manufaturing in Shanghai 
No 6  Michael Funke: Inflation in mainland China – modelling a roller coaster ride 











































Bank of Finland 
BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 




 + 358 10 831 2268 
bofit@bof.fi 
http://www.bof.fi/bofit 
 